In what sense is Frege’s (Statement of the) Puzzle “problematic”?
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| Autor: | |
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| Formato: | artículo original |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de Publicación: | 2015 |
| Descripción: | In this paper I take issue with Glezakos’s (2009) account of why Frege’s puzzle is un-puzzling. On her view, Frege’s statement of the puzzle –how can sentences of the form a=a and a=b, if true, differ in cognitive value if they express the same semantic content/are made true by the same object’s self-identity?– should not be considered any puzzling either because it is on the whole circular, or because, neutrally stated, it cannot even be set up. I argue against this that if, as she takes it, Frege’s statement is “problematic” it is not for the reasons she gives, but because it rests upon a couple of questionable assumptions; the assumptions that i) there is no ambiguity as to which aspect of the sign (in its relation to the referent) is relevant to a neutral statement of the puzzle ii) it is of the (sentence) forms themselves one may sensibly say they differ in cognitive value. |
| País: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Institución: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21317 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21317 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | frege’s puzzle cognitive value name individuation sentence forms type token puzzle de frege valor cognitivo individuación del nombre formas de la oración tipo ejemplar |