Understanding Anaphoric Dependence: A Reply to Glezakos
Guardat en:
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | artículo original |
| Estat: | Versión publicada |
| Data de publicació: | 2015 |
| Descripció: | Glezakos’s (2009) argument that Frege’s puzzle cannot motivate Fregean theories is that stating it requires presupposing a Fregean view, and hence it can be ignored by non-Fregeans. I respond by showing that the contrast needed for Frege’s cases requires only a notion of internal or de iure coreference, which pretheoretically does not presuppose Fregean commitments. |
| Pais: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Institution: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21324 |
| Accés en línia: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21324 |
| Paraula clau: | frege’s puzzle de iure co-reference sense identity validity puzzle de frege correferencia de iure sentido identidad validez |