Understanding Anaphoric Dependence: A Reply to Glezakos
Wedi'i Gadw mewn:
| Awdur: | |
|---|---|
| Fformat: | artículo original |
| Statws: | Versión publicada |
| Dyddiad Cyhoeddi: | 2015 |
| Disgrifiad: | Glezakos’s (2009) argument that Frege’s puzzle cannot motivate Fregean theories is that stating it requires presupposing a Fregean view, and hence it can be ignored by non-Fregeans. I respond by showing that the contrast needed for Frege’s cases requires only a notion of internal or de iure coreference, which pretheoretically does not presuppose Fregean commitments. |
| Gwlad: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Sefydliad: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Iaith: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21324 |
| Mynediad Ar-lein: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21324 |
| Allweddair: | frege’s puzzle de iure co-reference sense identity validity puzzle de frege correferencia de iure sentido identidad validez |