Beyond Descartes and reductive materialism: the relevance of ancient psychology in contemporary cognitive science
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| Avtor: | |
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| Format: | artículo original |
| Status: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de Publicación: | 2025 |
| Opis: | This article addresses the contemporary relevance of ancient conceptions of the psyche — particularly Aristotelian hylomorphism and Stoic psychosomatic monism — in relation to the hard problem of consciousness as formulated by contemporary philosophy of mind. It is assumed that the Cartesian disjunction between an irreducible immaterial substance and an eliminative materialism that treats the mental as a mere linguistic illusion exhausts the available options only if one accepts, from the outset, the Cartesian ontological framework within which that disjunction is stated. It is therefore argued that ancient and Hellenistic psychology offer a non-Cartesian framework capable of naturalizing the mind without stripping it of subjectivity or intentionality: in Aristotle, through the definition of the soul as the form or organizing structure of a living body in potentiality; in the Stoics, through the conception of the soul as a rational breath that pervades and structures the whole organism. To this end, the article examines Plato's tripartite psyche, Aristotelian hylomorphic functionalism, the Stoic cognitive architecture of the hegemonikon and its points of contact with contemporary embodied cognition, as well as the challenges that mental causation and artificial intelligence pose to this program. |
| País: | Portal de Revistas UNA |
| Institucija: | Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UNA |
| Jezik: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:www.revistas.una.ac.cr:article/23011 |
| Online dostop: | https://www.revistas.una.ac.cr/index.php/praxis/article/view/23011 |
| Ključna beseda: | hylomorphism Stoic psychology hard problem of consciousness intentionality functionalism hilemorfismo psicología estoica problema difícil de la conciencia intencionalidad funcionalismo |